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Abstract
The recent appearance and spread of novel infectious pathogens provide motivation for using models as tools to guide
public health decision-making. Here we describe a modeling approach for developing dynamic health policies that allow for
adaptive decision-making as new data become available during an epidemic. In contrast to static health policies which have
generally been selected by comparing the performance of a limited number of pre-determined sequences of interventions
within simulation or mathematical models, dynamic health policies produce ‘‘real-time’’ recommendations for the choice of
the best current intervention based on the observable state of the epidemic. Using cumulative real-time data for disease
spread coupled with current information about resource availability, these policies provide recommendations for
interventions that optimally utilize available resources to preserve the overall health of the population. We illustrate the
design and implementation of a dynamic health policy for the control of a novel strain of influenza, where we assume that
two types of intervention may be available during the epidemic: (1) vaccines and antiviral drugs, and (2) transmission
reducing measures, such as social distancing or mask use, that may be turned ‘‘on’’ or ‘‘off’’ repeatedly during the course of
epidemic. In this example, the optimal dynamic health policy maximizes the overall population’s health during the epidemic
by specifying at any point of time, based on observable conditions, (1) the number of individuals to vaccinate if vaccines are
available, and (2) whether the transmission-reducing intervention should be either employed or removed.
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Introduction
The recent appearance of novel human pathogens such as
H1N1 and H5N1 influenza, and SARS has stimulated efforts to
develop methods to determine health policies that allow for the
rapid modification of public health interventions in response to
varying epidemiological situations and changing availability of
information [1,2]. In this paper, we examine the potential utility of
dynamic health policies for controlling the spread of an emerging
infectious disease. Dynamic health policies make real-time recom-
mendations, in response to changing disease characteristics (e.g.
infectivity, antimicrobial resistance levels), population characteris-
tics (e.g. disease prevalence, proportion of individuals that are
immune), and resource constraints (e.g. vaccines, antimicrobial
drugs, personnel, and budget).
Most existing approaches for identifying optimal strategies for
infectious disease control use simulation or mathematical models
of disease spread to compare the performance of a limited number
of pre-determined health policies. A number of these studies aim to
identify optimal health policies for vaccine allocation before the start
of an epidemic without explicitly considering interventions which
can be employed during the epidemic [3–6]. A larger number of
studies investigate the effect of both initial immunization and the
use of controlling interventions during epidemics, such as use of
antiviral for treatment, case isolation, school closure, and internal
travel and border restrictions [7–13].
Although these approaches can provide insight into which
baseline strategies may best reduce the impact of epidemics, they
are not generally structured to assist real-time decision making
through the dynamic change of health recommendations as new
data become available over the course of epidemic. In this paper,
we focus on developing optimal dynamic health policies for
controlling an emerging human pathogen. These policies allow
decision-makers to use cumulative real-time data from the
epidemic and current information about resource availability to
guide their selection of possible interventions at any particular
point in time.
We use a simplified model of influenza spread to illustrate the
development and the employment of dynamic health policies.
Control of influenza epidemics may involve: (1) reducing the
susceptibility of uninfected individuals either before or during the
epidemic (through vaccination or antiviral prophylaxis), (2)
reducing contact rates in the population (through social distancing
such as isolation of diagnosed cases, quarantine of households of
diagnosed cases, closing of schools), and (3) reducing the infectious-
ness of infected individuals (through treatment or isolation).
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emergence of a novel strain would likely mean the absence (or
shortage) of an effective vaccine for at least the first several months
of the epidemic [14,15]. During this period, control strategies
would largely rely on social distancing and potentially on stockpiles
of antiviral drugs used for treatment and/or prophylaxis.
Therefore, efforts to control an emerging influenza epidemic
would be bounded by (1) the availability of effective vaccines and
antiviral drugs, and/or (2) the availability of money and resources
for vaccine procurement, diagnosis and treatment of new cases,
and the actual implementation of transmission reducing interven-
tions during the epidemic. Under such resource constraints, we
define the optimality of a dynamic health policy as the efficient use
of available resources (e.g. budget and medical system capacity) to
maximize the overall health of the population (e.g. minimizing the
number of deaths or hospitalizations, or maximizing other
measures such as quality-adjusted life years).
In this paper, we define several broad types of interventions for
controlling the spread of an emerging influenza virus. We use
these crudely classified interventions and a simplified model of
influenza transmission to illustrate the use of a dynamic
optimization methodology (namely, Markov Decision Process
[16]) to specify dynamic health policies. Here, rather than focusing
on developing a comprehensive model of influenza spread, we
demonstrate how these dynamic policies allow real-time decision
making under different resource constraints. We also discuss how
future research in this area can help make the implementation of
these policies possible.
Method
In this section, we first discuss the set of possible interventions
that can be used for controlling an influenza epidemic. We
describe the effect of these interventions on disease spread as well
as on the overall health-related and monetary consequences of the
epidemic. We then define dynamic health policies for controlling
the epidemic and characterize their optimality. We finally propose
a methodology to identify the optimal dynamic health policies for
controlling the epidemic.
A Model for Controlling the Spread of Influenza
Influenza Epidemic State and Decision Sets. An influenza
epidemic is usually described by a SIR (Susceptible-Infective-
Recovered) model, in which the individuals recovered from
infection are assumed to acquire permanent immunity to that
viral strain [7,17]. Let XS(t) denote the number of susceptibles,
XI(t) denote the number of infectives, and XR(t) denote the
number of recovered at time t. Since influenza epidemics usually
last for several months and the number of deaths is generally small
relative to population size, it is reasonable to assume that the
population size does not change over the course of epidemic. For a
population of a fixed size N, the state of the disease spread at any
given time t can be identified by st~(XS(t),XI(t)). Let V denote
the state space defined as V~f(xS,xI)[ 2jxSzxIƒNg.
Decisions are made at points of time referred to as decision epochs.
It is more convenient to assume that the decisions are made at
discrete points of time, rather than continuously over time; hence,
we assume that the set of decision epochs, T , is discrete; that is
T ~ft0,t1,t2,...,THg, where TH denotes the decision horizon
length. We classify the possible interventions to control the spread
of influenza into two categories: (1) ‘‘irreversible’’ interventions
such as vaccination employed either before or during the epidemic
which reduce the number of susceptibles, and (2) ‘‘reversible’’
interventions which can be turned on and off during the course of
epidemic to reduce the transmission of infection to susceptibles,
such as hygienic interventions, social distancing, and treatment.
We implement these two types of decisions in our model as follows:
1. Vaccination: At any decision epoch, conditional on the
availability of vaccine, the decision maker will specify the
number of susceptibles to vaccinate. If effective vaccines are
abundant and vaccination has zero cost, this decision is trivial:
vaccinate all susceptibles. However, throughout this paper we
assume that vaccine, if available, is acquired at a price. We
denote this decision by zt[AI, where AI is the set of possible
values for the decision variable zt. For cases where vaccine
availability exceeds need, we may assume that AI~½0,N . For
simplicity, we assume that vaccination at decision epoch t
results in immunization by the next decision epoch. Hence, a
decision to vaccinate zt portion of susceptibles at time t results
in the reduction of susceptibles to XS(t){zt by the next
decision epoch.
2. Transmission-reducing intervention: These interventions may
be either employed or lifted over the course of epidemic to
reduce the transmission of infection to remaining susceptibles.
These measures will include social distancing (e.g. school or
public place closure), hygienic interventions (e.g. mask use), and
treatment or isolation of cases. Let AT~f0,1,2...,Mg denote
the set of such interventions, where 0 represents ‘‘no
intervention.’’ We denote the transmission-reducing decision
made at time t by at[AT.
We categorize ‘‘treatment’’ as a transmission-reducing inter-
vention which can be turned on or off during the epidemic. Of
course, when sufficient antivirals are available, all new cases
receive appropriate treatment, in which case ‘‘treatment’’ will not
be included as a decision in the model. However, under conditions
of antiviral limitation, one may include ‘‘treatment’’ as an
intervention which can be turned on or off during the epidemic;
this situation may occur when the use of antiviral must be
prioritized among population subgroups [3,4].
To control the epidemic, a policy maker will continue to make
decisions until the prevalence of the disease is sufficiently low. The
stochastic nature of transmission (which is especially important
during emergence or eradication), prevents accurate identification
of the time when the disease will be eradicated; hence, we consider
an infinite decision horizon: T~ft0,t1,t2,...g [16]. Although the
decision horizon is infinity, we assume the decision making process
stops when there are no more infectious individuals in the
population.
Rewards and Transition Probabilities. As the result of
vaccination employed at time t~f0,1,2,...g, the number of
susceptibles is reduced from XS(t) to XS(t){zt by the next
decision epoch, and the policy maker receives a reward
r(st,zt)~{pzt, where p is the unit price of vaccine.
As the result of a transmission-reducing intervention employed
at time t~f1,2,...g, i.e. at[AT, the spread of disease at the next
decision epoch is determined by the probability distribution
P(:jst,at), and the policy maker receives a reward r(st,at).
The reward r(st,at) can be characterized in several ways and the
choice of reward structure should reflect the policy maker’s set of
priorities. For example, if the policy maker wants to minimize the
total number of individuals infected over the course of epidemic,
then reward r(st,at) can be simply defined as r(st,at)~E½I(t)j
st,at , where I(t) is the number of new infections during the period
t. However, efforts to control epidemics may be bounded by the
availability of medical resources, such as vaccines, medical
personnel, and antiviral drugs, and monetary resources for vaccine
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interventions. In these situations, where both health-related
outcomes and the resource consumption level are essential for
determining the optimality of a health policy, a more compre-
hensive reward function is needed. A common approach for
defining optimality in these situations is to assume that the policy
maker’s objective is to maximize the population’s net monetary
benefit [18]. To characterize the reward r(st,at) accordingly, we
must define several additional parameters:
N l: policy maker’s willingness-to-pay (WTP) for health.
N c: cost incurred for each incident infection (this may include
diagnosis, treatment and other indirect costs).
N cT(at): cost of implementing the intervention at[AT for period
t; we assume cT(0)~0.
N u(st,at): expected costs incurred during the period t if the
disease spread at time t is at state st and the policy maker
implements the intervention at[AT at decision epoch t;
u(st,at)~cE½I(t)jst,at zcT(at).
N w: loss in health (quantified by quality-adjusted life years) due
to infections.
N q(st,at): expected loss in population’s health during the period
t if the disease spread at time t is at state st and the policy
maker uses intervention at[AT at decision epoch t;
q(st,at)~wE½I(t)jst,at .
Now, the reward r(st,at), defined as the expected net monetary
benefit during the period ½t,tzDt  if the disease spread at time t is
at state st and the policy maker chooses intervention at[AT at
decision epoch t, is calculated by r(st,at)~{lq(st,at){u(st,at).
Decision Rules, Health Policies and Optimality. A
decision rule prescribes an action for each state for a specified
decision epoch. For decision epoch t~0, a decision rule is a
function d0 : V?AI, which specifies the number zI[AI of
susceptibles to vaccinate given the initial disease state
(XS(0),XI(0))[V. For decisions that must be made during the
course of the epidemic (t~f1,2,...g), we focus on a Markovian
decision rule because this is the most convenient to implement and
evaluate. Such decision rules are functions dt : V?AT|AI,
which for each state of the disease spread, assign a transmission-
reducing intervention at[AT and a proportion zt[AI of
susceptibles to vaccinate. This decision rule is said to be
Markovian (memoryless) because it depends on previous disease
states and previously utilized interventions only through the
current state of the disease spread.
A policy specifies a decision rule to be used at all decision epochs.
In other words, a policy p is a sequence of decision rules
p~(d0,d1,d2,...). We call a policy stationary if dt~d for
t[f1,2,...g; that is, the policy prescribes the same decision for
the given state s regardless of the time period in which this state is
reached. In this paper, we are only interested in characterizing
stationary health policies since they are the most feasible to
implement in practice and their optimality can be proven [16].
Assuming that the influenza spread is at state s1 at decision
epoch t~1, the expected total discounted reward induced by
policy p~(d0,d,d,...) over the course of epidemic is calculated
as:
vp(s1)~Ep X?
t~1 ct{1r(st,d(st))js1
hi
, ð1Þ
where c[½0,1  is the discount factor to account for the time value of
the future rewards.
Now, assuming that at decision epoch t~0, the state of the
disease spread is s0, the expected total reward induced by policy
p~(d0,d,d,...) is:
Vp(s0)~r(s0,d0(s0))zcvp(s1)
~{pd0(s0)zcvp(XS(0){d0(s0),XI(1)):
ð2Þ
Let P denote the set of all possible stationary policies
p~(d0,d,d,...). We say that a policy p [P is optimal whenever:
Vp 
(s0)§Vp(s0) for each s0[V and all p[P: ð3Þ
Define v (s):vp 
(s), where vp 
(s) is calculated by Eq. (1) for
p~p .
Implicit in the definition of stationary policies is the assumption
that model parameters are known and do not change over time.
This assumption allows the existence of an optimal stationary
policy p~(d0,d,d,...), where the function d(:) is time indepen-
dent. Undoubtedly, this assumption may be violated for emergent
influenza epidemics, and the model parameters may need to be
updated as new data accrues over time. We return to this issue in
later sections and discuss how stationary policies can be
determined in this setting. But, for clarity of presentation, we first
assume that the parameters of the influenza model are constant
and estimable from the initial spread of the epidemic.
A Markov Decision Process Formulation for Influenza
Spread
There are several dynamic optimization methodologies that can
be used to find the policy p  defined in inequality (3). The most
appropriate optimization method depends on the complexity of
the underlying epidemic model, the observability of the epidemic
state, and the desired level of computational efficiency. As a rule of
thumb, finding the exact optimal policy p  becomes more
challenging (and sometimes impossible) as (1) the complexity of
epidemic model increases or (2) the uncertainty around the true
state of the disease spread arises. Several methodologies can help
identify the approximate optimal policy p  even when the epidemic
model is relatively complex and only some probabilistic knowledge
about the current state of the epidemic can be obtained. We
discuss the challenges of optimal decision-making under uncer-
tainty at further length in the Discussion section.
If the disease dynamics can be modeled by a discrete-time
Markov chain and the state of the epidemic is observable over the
course of epidemic, then the stationary optimal health policy p  in
inequality (3) can be efficiently obtained through Markov Decision
Process (MDP) [16]. In our illustrative example of a novel influenza
epidemic, we make several simplifying assumptions about the
spread of influenza to be able to use MDP. We enumerate these
assumptions in the following subsections; we then discuss how these
simplifying assumptions can be relaxed in further work.
We describe epidemic influenza with a SIR model, in which
individuals acquire permanent immunity through infection or
vaccination. We do not consider the possibility of changes in the
population size due to birth, immigration, or death in order to
simplify the analysis. Let Dt denote the time interval between two
consecutive decision epochs. We assume that individuals become
infected only through contact with other infectious members of the
population, and that contacts during the interval ½t,tzDt  occur
according to a homogenous Poisson process, with rate mDt.
Dynamic Health Policies
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½t{Dt,t  becomes infectious and symptomatic at time t and
interacts with the rest of the population during period ½t,tzDt ;
the individual is then removed from the population (or recovered)
at time tzDt. As we will describe later, these simplifying
assumptions allow the use of Markov decision process to identify
the optimal decision at each decision epoch. In the Discussion
section, we explain how these assumptions can be relaxed.
Let t denote probability that a susceptible person becomes
infected upon contact with an infectious individual and b(t) denote
probability that the next interaction of a random susceptible
person is with an infectious person. When social distancing has not
been used and mixing is homogenous, b(t) is equal to
b(t)~XI(t)=N. Variables t and b(t) can be respectively modified
by ‘‘hygienic interventions’’ (reducing the chance of transmission
given contact between infectious and susceptible individuals) and
‘‘social distancing’’ (reducing the likelihood of contact between
susceptible and infectious individuals). Let Q(t) denote overall
probability that a susceptible person becomes infected. This
probability is calculated in [19] as:
Q(t)~1{e{mDtb(t)t: ð4Þ
Hence, given the state of the disease spread, i.e.
st~(XS(t),XI(t)), the number of new infections during period
½t,tzDt , denoted by I(t), will have a binomial distribution with
number of trials XS(t) and the probability of success Q(t):
PI(t)(ijXS(t),XI(t))~
XS(t)
i
  
w(t)
i(1{w(t))
XS(t){i,
for 0ƒiƒXS(t),
0,otherwise:
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
ð5Þ
The transition probabilities of the Markov chain
f(XS(t),XI(t)) : t~0,1,...g can then be calculated by (refer to
Text S1 for detailed steps):
Prf(XS(tzDt),XI(tzDt))~(xS,xI)jXS(t),XI(t)g
~
PI(t)(xIjXS(t),XI(t)),
forxSzxI~XS(t),0ƒxSƒXS(t),0ƒxIƒXS(t),
0,otherwise:
8
> > <
> > :
ð6Þ
We consider two types of interventions: (1) vaccination and (2)
transmission-reducing interventions. First, we assume that no
vaccines will become available any time during the epidemic;
therefore, the health policy p~(d,d,...) only specifies the optimal
transmission-reducing intervention a 
t[AT to implement at decision
epoch t[f1,2,...g. We will show later how optimal vaccination
decisions can be made once vaccine becomes available. Also, for
simplicity, we assume that only one transmission-reducing interven-
tion is available; hence AT~
f0,1g. Selecting intervention 1 at decision epoch t, i.e. at~1, reduces
probability Q(t) in Eq. (4) to Q(t)~1{e{(1{aT)mDtb(t)t(t),w h e r e
aT[½0,1  is the fractional reduction in the infection transmission rate.
Let P(s’js,a) denote the probability that the influenza epidemic
will be in state s’ at decision epoch tzDt, given that that the state
is s at decision epoch t and the policy maker implements
intervention a[f0,1g at decision epoch t. This probability is
calculated by transition probability (6).
Since we first assume that no vaccine is available during the
course of the epidemic (we relax this assumption below), the policy
maker can only select decisions from set AT~f0,1g. Given this
assumption, the optimal solution to the policy maker’s problem
during the course of epidemic (i.e. maximizing Eq. (1)) is obtained
by solving the following set of recursive equations [16]:
v (s)~ max
a[f0,1g
fr(s,a)zc
X
s’[V
P(s’js,a)v (s’)g,for s[V: ð7Þ
By definition, function v (s) returns the expected total
discounted reward induced by the optimal policy over the
remaining course of epidemic if the current state of epidemic is
s. Therefore, having found the function v (s),s[V, by solving the
set of equations (7), we can then determine the optimal
transmission-reducing decision for a given state s by:
a (s)~argmax
a[f0,1g
fr(s,a)zc
X
s’[V
P(s’js,a)v (s’)g: ð8Þ
Results
To illustrate the use of the proposed methodology, we consider
the case of an influenza outbreak in an English boarding school
reported in [20] and recently used by [2] and [21]. The population
consisted of N~763 students and the infection was believed to be
introduced by one student returning from Asia. The situation
satisfies many requirements of a simple SIR model, particularly
since no specific intervention was employed during the outbreak.
For a population of size N, the transition probability matrix of
the Markov chain f(XS(t),XI(t)) : t~0,1,...g is of size
0:5(Nz1)
2, which causes computational problems for our effort
to identify optimal health policies. To overcome this computa-
tional difficulty, several effective alternative solutions have been
proposed in the literature of dynamic optimization; the reader is
referred to [22] for comprehensive discussion. One approach to
reduce the state space of the Markov chain f(XS(t),XI
(t)) : t~0,1,...g is ‘‘state aggregation’’, in which the Markov
chain f(XS(t),XI(t)) : t~0,1,...g is approximated by the Markov
chain f(HS(t),HI(t)) : t~0,1,...g, where HC(t), C[fS,Ig, is the
proportion of population in class C[fS,Ig at time t. Detailed steps
for how one can make these approximations are provided in the
attached Text S1. Note that although we consider a relatively
small population here, however, the approximation method briefly
described above can also be used for larger populations.
The influenza spread model described previously has two
parameters, m and t, which should be estimated from the data.
Using maximum likelihood estimation, we estimate m~20 per day
and t~13:7%. Figure 1 shows each day’s expected number of new
infections calculated by the model versus the observed data. Note
that in Figure 1, the observations on days 1 and 2 are not shown.
The reason is as follows: since in the approximate Markov chain
f(HS(t),HI(t)) : t~0,1,...g, the states of influenza spread are
aggregated, the model is not able to accurately capture the state of
the epidemic when the number of infections is very low. For the
observations presented in Figure 1, the number of new cases in
days 1 and 2 are respectively 1 and 6, which are too low to be
captured by the approximate Markov chain f(HS(t),HI
(t)) : t~0,1,...g. For detailed discussion, refer to Text S1 and
[19].
To determine optimal dynamic health policies for this
population, we use the following arbitrary settings. We consider
one transmission-reducing intervention which reduces the rate of
Dynamic Health Policies
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$.,2000 per day. One such transmission-reducing intervention
might be ‘‘having all students wash their hands twice a day’’. The
vaccine price is set to p~$25; each incident infection costs
c~$100 to diagnose and treat and results in a health loss of
0.00342 QALY (assuming that the treatment period lasts 5 days
during which the health quality of the patient is reduced by 25%:
5|0:25=365~0:00342).
Optimal policies during the epidemic are obtained by solving the
set of equations (7) for v (:) and then using Eq. (8) to find the optimal
decision a (s) for each state s[V. We use a policy iteration algorithm
[16] with a discount factor c~0:99 to solve the set of equations (7).
Figure 2 displays the optimal health policies for WTP for health
equal to $.,25000/QALY. The conditions for recommending the
use of the transmission-reducing intervention are presented as the
grey regions within the triangle in the upper part of each figure.
For example, the transmission-reducing intervention should be
implemented if the state of the disease is (hS,hI)~(0:5,0:2), and
should not be used when the state of the disease is
(hS,hI)~(0:15,0:4). Text S1 includes additional health polices
corresponding to different levels of WTP.
Asdiscussedpreviously,wemustalsoidentifytheoptimalnumber
of susceptibles to vaccinate when an effective vaccine becomes
available. Let us assume that the entire population is susceptible
before the start of epidemic, i.e. XS(0)~x0
S~N, among which x1
I
susceptibles become infectious by time t~1. If we assume that
effective vaccines become available at time t~0 at a market price p,
then the policy maker determines the number the suscpetibles to
immunize, z0, by solving the following optimization problem:
V(x0
S)~ max
0ƒz0ƒx0
S{x1
I
v  x0
S{z0{x1
I,x1
I
  
{pz0, ð9Þ
in which, the variable z0 only takes integer values over the interval
½0,x0
S{x1
I .
The rectangle in bottom of Figure 2, labeled as ‘‘% of
susceptibles to immunize at t~0,’’ represents the optimal health
policies for immunization before the start of epidemic; again, if
vaccine is not yet available, it may not be possible to achieve these
levels of immunization. These recommendations are obtained by
solving problem (9).
Employing Dynamic Health Policies to Control Influenza
Spread
In this section, we discuss how the optimal dynamic health
policy for using the transmission-reducing intervention and
vaccinating additional susceptible individuals in decision epochs
is determined as an epidemic progresses and new data become
available.
Table 1 shows the observable information that accrues during
an epidemic. Before the start of epidemic, at time t~0, the policy
maker obtains an estimate for XS(0), denoted by ^ x x0
S. For a novel
strain of influenza, we assume that the entire population is
susceptible, hence ^ x x0
S~N for these situations. The policy maker
also obtains a prior distribution for the number of susceptibles who
may become infectious by time t~1. Let the number of infectives
at time t~1 be randomly distributed according to probability
mass function PXI(1)(:) with support ½0,^ x x0
S . The policy maker can
then use the following optimization problem to find the number of
susceptibles to immunize at time t~0:
z 
0~argmax
0ƒz0ƒ^ x x0
S
X
^ x x0
S{z0
xI~0
v  ^ x x0
S{z0{xI,xI
  
PXI(1)(xI){pz0, ð10Þ
in which, the variable z0 only takes integer values over the interval
½0,^ x x0
S .
Using observation of the number of new infections occurring
during the epidemic, we update our knowledge on the state of the
epidemic for the next decision epochs as follows. At the beginning of
Figure 1. Observed new cases in the English boarding school versus the model’s predictions. This figure shows each day’s expected
number of new infections calculated by the model (presented by solid curve) versus the observed data (presented by dots). The dotted curves show
the model’s expected number of new infections +3 times its standard deviation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024043.g001
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I new infections are observed which implies that the
number of susceptibles at this time is ^ x x1
S~^ x x0
S{z 
0{^ x x1
I. At the end
of each period t, ^ I It new infections are observed. This observation
impliesthat (1)the numberof susceptibles at the beginning of period
tz1 is ^ x xtz1
S ~^ x xt
S{^ I It and (2)thenumberofinfectivesattime tz1 is
^ I It, since we assume that all infectives at time t are removed or
recovered by the next decision epoch (see Table 1).
Now, knowing that the epidemic is at state (^ x xt
S,^ x xt
I) and
assuming that no vaccine is available at time t, the optimal
transmission-reducing decisions for period t is obtained by solving
Eq. (8) (which can also be summarized in form of the policy shown
in Figure 2).
Now assume that at decision epoch t, vaccines for the epidemic
strain of influenza either become available for the first time or that
depleted stocks of vaccine have now been replenished. Let
^ v v(xS,xI;at,zt) denote the expected reward if influenza spread is
in state (xS,xI) at time t, the transmission-reducing intervention
at[f0,1g is implemented during period ½t,tzDt , and ztƒxS
Figure 2. Optimal stationary health policy for l~$.,25000/QALY. The conditions for recommending the use of the transmission-reducing
intervention is presented within the triangle in the upper part of each figure. In disease states consistent with those that are captured within the grey
cells, the intervention should be used. For instance, the transmission-reducing intervention should be implemented if the state of the disease is
(hS,hI)~(0:5,0:2), and should not be used when the state of the disease is (hS,hI)~(0:15,0:4). The rectangle in bottom of this figure, labeled as ‘‘% of
susceptibles to immunize at t~0,’’ represents the optimal health policies for immunization before the start of epidemic given that vaccine is available
at a market price.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024043.g002
Table 1. Observed information over the course of an epidemic.
Period 0 1 2 ... t
Observed number of ^ x x0
S ^ x x1
S~^ x x0
S{z 
0{^ x x1
I ^ x x2
S~^ x x1
S{^ I I1 ^ x xt
S~^ x xt{1
S {^ I It{1
susceptibles, ^ X XS(t)
Observed number of ^ x x1
I ^ x x2
I~^ I I1 ^ x xt
I~^ I It{1
infectives, ^ X XI(t)
Observed new infections, ^ I I(t) ^ I I1 ^ I I2 ^ I It
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024043.t001
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function ^ v v(xS,xI;at,zt) is calculated as:
^ v v(xS,xI;at,zt)~r(xS,xI;at){pztzc
X
s’[V’(zt)
P(s’jxS,xI;at)v (s’)
ð11Þ
where V’(zt)~f(x’S,x’I)[Vjx’S~xS{ztg. The optimal transmis-
sion-reducing intervention (a 
t) and the number of susceptibles to
vaccinate (z 
t) during the period ½t,tzDt  is then determined by
solving the following problem:
max ^ v v(^ x xt
S,^ x xt
I;at,zt),
0ƒztƒ^ x xt
S,
at[f0,1g
ð12Þ
where ^ v v(xS,xI;at,zt) is given by Eq. (11) and the variable zt only
takes integer values over the interval ½0,^ x xt
S .
As briefly pointed out before, to determine the stationary health
policy p ~½a (:) , we assumed that the parameters of the influenza
spread model are all known and do not change over time. It is,
however, more realistic to assume that as new data become
available over the course of epidemics, policy makers also update
the parameters of the underlying transmission model. Table 2
outlines a procedure describing how dynamic health policies can
be employed when policy maker is using the real-time data to also
update the parameters of the influenza spread model.
Optimal Dynamic Health Policies under Resource
Constraint
The optimal health policies developed in the previous section do
not consider the availability of resources (e.g. vaccines, budget, and
antiviral for treatment) while making health recommendations.
For example, the policy presented in Figure 2, recommends
vaccinating 99% of the remaining susceptibles when the initial
proportion of susceptibles is 0:8; this recommendation does not
account for the number of vaccines that are actually available.
Similarly, the recommendations for turning on and off the
transmission-reducing intervention do not account for the budget
and resources necessary to initiate or terminate these recommen-
dations. The framework proposed here can be expanded to
incorporate different forms of resource constraints while con-
structing dynamic health policies. In this section, we discuss policy
development under three types of resource limitations.
Let us first consider the case where n vaccines are available at
time t~0, and the policy maker must decide how many
susceptibles to vaccinate using these n vaccines. For now, let us
assume that no additional vaccines will become available during
the epidemic and any unused vaccine by time t~1 will be lost (e.g.
shipped to other communities). The policy maker can now use
Figure 3 to select the WTP for which a feasible vaccination
recommendation can be implemented. For a given initial
proportion of susceptibles h
0
S, Figure 3 identifies the number of
vaccines required for each value of WTP (l) through solving the
optimization problem (10). As an example, for h
0
S~0:5, if the
policy maker’s sole objective is to minimize cost (i.e. l~
$0=QALY) 352 vaccines are required and for any WTP l§
$.,25000/QALY, 367 vaccines should be used. Note that for
h
0
S~0:5, vaccinating less than 352 susceptibles results in a
monetary loss, and vaccinating more than 367 susceptibles does
not increase the population’s expected net monetary benefit for
any l§ $.,25000/QALY.
Now to demonstrate how a vaccine supply constraint can be
accounted for in constructing an optimal health policy, let us
assume that for our population, at time t~0 (before the start of
epidemic), there are n~550 vaccines available (the same approach
can be followed for all other decision epochs). When n~550
vaccines are available, then according to Figure 3, for any initial
proportion of susceptibles h
0
Sv0:76 any health policy with l§
$.,25000/QALY can be used to optimally allocate all of the
available vaccines. For any initial proportion of susceptibles
h
0
S§0:76, all 550 vaccines should be used.
Now we consider a more complex scenario of vaccine limitation
where vaccines become available in varying quantities over several
decision epochs. Let us assume that at time t~0, the policy maker
knows with certainty that during the following H decision epochs
f1,2,...,Hg, fn1,n2,...,nHg vaccines will become available. Like
before, we assume that any vaccine unused during a period will be
lost at the end of the period. Given epidemic state
(XS(t),XI(t))~(xt
S,xt
I) and nt available vaccines at time t, the
policy maker must now decide how many susceptibles to vaccinate
and also whether to implement the transmission-reducing
intervention. To illustrate how these decisions can be made at
each decision epoch, let us assume that H~2 (cases with Hw2
are solved in a similar fashion).
Table 2. Determining Dynamic Health Policies Using Real-Time Data.
At time t=0
1. Obtain estimates for model parameters (^ m m,^ t t), initial number of susceptibles, ^ x x0
S, and a prior distribution for random variable XI(1).
2. Use Eqs. (7)–(8) to determine the dynamic health policy p ~½a (:) .
3. Find the optimal number of susceptibles to immunize, z 
0, using Eq. (10).
4. Increment time to t~1.
5. Update the number of susceptibles at time t~1: ^ x x1
S~^ x x0
S{z 
0{^ x x1
I.
While ^ X XI t ðÞ w0 :
1. Given the availability of vaccine, use Eq. (8) or Eq. (12) to find the optimal number of susceptibles to immunize, z 
t, and the optimal transmission-reducing
intervention, a 
t.
2. At the end of period t, use the real-time data f^ I I1,^ I I2,...,^ I Itg to update the model parameters (using for instance, maximum likelihood estimation) and the
dynamic health policy p ~½a (:) , using Eqs. (7)–(8).
3. Increment time: t/tz1.
4. Use Table 1 to update the epidemic state at time t.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024043.t002
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start by finding the optimal decisions for the final decision epoch
for which vaccines are supplied (i.e. t~H~2 in this example). If at
decision epoch t~2, the epidemic is at state
(XS(2),XI(2))~(x2
S,x2
I) with n2 vaccines available, the optimal
recommendations for vaccination and transmission-reducing
intervention are determined by solving the problem:
v 
2(x2
S,x2
I)~ max
0ƒz2ƒn2
a2[f0,1g
^ v v(x2
S,x2
I;at,zt), ð13Þ
where ^ v v(x2
S,x2
I;at,zt) is calculated by Eq. 11. Next, we step
backward in time and determine the optimal decisions for epoch
t~1. If at time t~1, the epidemic is at state
(XS(1),XI(1))~(x1
S,x1
I) with n1 vaccines available, the optimal
decisions at time t~1 is determined by:
v 
1(x1
S,x1
I)~ max
0ƒz1ƒn1
a1[f0,1g
r(x1
S,x1
I;a1){pz1zl
X
(x
02
S ,x
02
I )[V0(z1)
P(x
02
S ,x
02
I jx1
S,x1
I;a1)v 
2(x
02
S ,x
02
I ),
ð14Þ
where V’(z1)~f(x
02
S ,x
02
I )[Vjx
02
S ~x2
S{z1g and v 
2(x
02
S ,x
02
I ) is
already calculated in problem (13).
Now to employ this new dynamic health policy that was
generated under assumptions of known vaccine constraints
fn1,n2g, we take the following steps (note that we assume here
that no vaccine is available at time t~0):
Step 1: At time t~1, for the observed state (^ x x1
S,^ x x1
I) and
n1 available vaccines, use problem (14) to find the
optimal number of susceptibles to vaccinate and the
transmission-reducing intervention to implement.
Step 2: Update the epidemic state using the observed
number of new cases during period 1, ^ I I1 (see Table 1).
Step 3: At time t~2, for the observed state (^ x x2
S,^ x x2
I) and
n2 available vaccines, use problem (13) to find the
optimal number of susceptibles to vaccinate and the
transmission-reducing intervention to implement.
Step 4: For the remaining decision epochs t§3, use
Table 1 to update the epidemic state and then use
problem (8) to find the optimal transmission-reducing
intervention to employ.
Finally, we discuss how budget constraints can be accounted for
while generating dynamic health policies. From a methodological
perspective, ensuring that budgetary limitations are not exceeded
while attempting to control an epidemic is more challenging
primarily due to the stochastic nature of disease spread that leads
to high variance for the expected costs incurred. However, if we
assume that the policy maker is mainly interested in keeping the
expected cost incurred during epidemic lower than a constant
budget threshold, Figure 4 can be used to select the health policy
which satisfies such a constraint.
Suppose that for our population, after vaccination phase at
t~0, the proportion of susceptibles at t~1 is reduced to 0:7, and
that the policy maker sets the budget threshold at b~$.,50000.
Then, Figure 4 indicates that for WTP l~$.,100000/QALY the
expected cost incurred during epidemic remains below b
als$.,50000. Therefore, the policy maker should use the health
policy generated by setting the willingness-to-pay l~$.,100000/
QALY to guide decision making during the epidemic.
Evaluating the Effect of Dynamic Health Policies in
Controlling the Spread of Influenza
To study the effect of employing the dynamic health policies,
we built a simulation model for influenza spread in the
population described above. Figure 5 displays the expected
number of new infections during each period when aT~40% and
policies corresponding to different WTP are employed, given the
Figure 3. Number of Vaccines Required. Each line specifies the optimal number of vaccines required by different WTP for health. For a given
initial number of susceptibles, the policy maker can use this figure to find the WTP for health whose corresponding policy satisfies the vaccine
constraint.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024043.g003
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the start of epidemic. If vaccines were available in sufficient
quantities to employ the and the vaccine recommendations in
Figure 5, the epidemic would be averted and there would be no
need to employ dynamic policies. The incidence of disease for
these policies in each period were statistically different with each
other at 1000 simulation runs. As shown in Figure 5, as the
willingness-to-pay for health increases, the expected number of
individuals infected during the epidemic is reduced since the
policies corresponding to the higher willingness-to-pay tend to be
more aggressive in implementing the transmission-reducing
intervention.
Evaluating the Assumption of the Observability of New
Cases
In previous section, we assumed that the policy maker is able to
accurately measure the number of new infections occurring in
each period. This is a strong assumption that will be violated for
many infectious diseases (including influenza) where diagnosis is
difficult and for which the number of reported cases is an
underestimate for the actual number of infections. To examine the
sensitivity of the performance of the generated dynamic health
policies to the assumption that all cases are observed, we assume
that the policy maker’s observation of the number of cases during
Figure 4. Expected Budget Required During Epidemic. Each curve specifies the expected budget required by different WTP for health. For a
given initial number of susceptibles, the policy maker can use this figure to find the WTP for health whose corresponding policy satisfies the budget
constraint.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024043.g004
Figure 5. Effect of dynamic health policies on controlling the spread of influenza when no vaccine is available. As the willingness-to-
pay for health increases, the expected number of individuals infected during the epidemic is reduced since the policies corresponding to the higher
willingness-to-pay tend to be more aggressive in implementing the transmission-reducing intervention.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024043.g005
Dynamic Health Policies
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 September 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 9 | e24043period ½t,tzDt  is only a portion of the true number of cases; that
is ^ x xtz1
I ~(1ze(t))I(t), where e(t) is the percent error in identi-
fying the number of new cases during period ½t,tzDt .
If the error term e(t) is a constant in each period, i.e. e(t)~gt,
and known to the policy maker, the number of susceptibles and the
number of infectives in Table 1 can be calculated, respectively, as
^ x xt
S~^ x xt{1
S {(1zgt{1)^ I It{1 and ^ x xt
I~(1zgt{1)^ I It{1. Hence, the
constant observation error e(t)~gt can be easily corrected in
order to preserve the optimality of dynamic health policies under
this error setting.
Now let us assume that the error term e(t) has the form
e(t)~gtze, where gt is a constant known to the policy maker and
e is a normally distributed noise with mean zero and standard
deviation s( ). The effect of the constant term gt can be corrected
like before by using equations ^ x xt
S~^ x xt{1
S {(1zgt{1)^ I It{1 and
^ x xt
I~(1zgt{1)^ I It{1 to update the current information about the
epidemic state in Table 1. The effect of the random noise cannot
be corrected; yet, the impact of this noise on the performance of
the dynamic health policies can be investigated through
simulation. Figure 6 shows the effect of uncertainty around the
number of observed cases on the capability of dynamic health
policies in controlling the epidemic in our population, for different
WTP for health. We find that as the standard deviation of noise,
s( ), increases, the total number of individuals affected by the
epidemic also increases; however, this increase is linear with a low
rate which implies that for our population the performance of the
generated dynamic health policies is not highly sensitive to the
assumption of observability of new cases.
If this simulation analysis shows significant sensitivity of the
performance of dynamic health policies to the assumption of
observability of new cases, or the policy maker believes that the
probability distribution of noise e varies over time (for instance, if
vigilance of testing diagnosis increases or decreases over time),
then more advanced optimization tools can be employed. This
issue is briefly discussed in the Discussion section.
Discussion
The emergence of novel human pathogens (e.g. H1N1 and
H5N1 influenza, SARS) and their devastating health and financial
consequences on affected populations have highlighted the need
for developing methods which allow real-time selection of health
interventions to control the epidemic while effective vaccines are
not available or not present in sufficient quantities to prevent
disease spread. We refer to policies informed by such methods as
dynamic health policies which are intended to allow for real-time
recommendations to be made in response to changing disease and
population characteristics as well as the availability of resources.
In contrast to most existing approaches for identifying optimal
strategies for infectious disease control which use simulation or
mathematical models of disease spread to compare the performance
of a limited number of pre-determined health policies, we proposed the
use of ‘‘dynamic programming’’ [23] to characterize and identify
optimal dynamic health policies. We demonstrated how a Markov
decision process [16] can be employed to find optimal dynamic
health policies for a simple model of influenza epidemic, in which
two types of interventions may be available during the epidemic to
control the influenza spread: (1) vaccination, and (2) a transmission-
reducing intervention, such as social distancing. The generated
dynamic health policies help the policy maker to determine (1) how
to allocate vaccines when they become available, and (2) whether
the transmission-reducing intervention, such as school closure,
should be employed or lifted given the number of susceptibles and
infectives at any point of time.
While we used a discrete-time Markov decision process, a
number of other methodologies have also been proposed and
Figure 6. Expected total number of new infections versus the standard deviation of the error in observing the number of new
cases. As the standard deviation of noise increases, reflecting imperfect surveillance capacity, the total number of individuals affected by the
epidemic also increases. However, this increase occurs linearly at a low rate, which implies that for our population the performance of the generated
dynamic health policies is not extremely sensitive to the assumption of observability of new cases.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0024043.g006
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policies for controlling emerging epidemic. For instance, Lefevre
[24] used a continuous-time Markov decision model, Merl et al.
[2] developed a statistical framework and Ludkovski and Niemi
[21] developed a simulation-based model for dynamic determina-
tion of optimal policies for emerging epidemics. Undoubtedly,
comparing the effectiveness of these methodologies when em-
ployed in real practice merits a separate research study.
The influenza model proposed in this paper is very simple and
not intended to realistically model disease spread or be used
directly to guide the selection of interventions. We present it only
for illustration of our proposed approach for dynamic decision
making. The model makes several simplifying assumptions that
were required for using an MDP to generate the optimal health
policies: first, we require that the number of new infections during
each period is observable by the policy maker, and second, we
assume that an infectious individual interacts with the rest of the
population only during the next period and then is effectively
removed (treated or isolated) from the population. Relaxing these
two assumptions will mean the state of the epidemic is
unobservable; yet, a probability belief about the epidemic state
can often be generated as new data become available. If we relax
these assumptions, we can use generalized discrete-time Markov
models for infectious diseases proposed in [19] and use partially
observable Markov decision process (POMDP) [25] to character-
ize optimal health policies. However, as the number of states
required to model disease spread increases, MDP and POMDP
rapidly lose their efficiency. In these cases, approximate dynamic
programming [22] using a simulation model may be employed to
identify optimal dynamic health policies. Accordingly, the
framework we propose here can potentially be extended to inform
decision-making for control of a pathogen with a more complex
natural history such as tuberculosis or to design interventions that
consider distinct responses targeted toward different risk groups.
Such extensions are attractive topics for future research.
As a final note, for the successful implement of the dynamic
health policies in practice, the mathematical or simulation model
of the disease spread along with the optimization technique used
for finding the dynamic health policies must be coupled with an
surveillance system that can supply data to estimate the
parameters of the underlying model and to provide knowledge
on the state of the epidemic. Although dynamic optimization
techniques are capable of handling noisy observations, inaccura-
cies in the surveillance and reporting system may result in
suboptimal policies, further underscoring the tremendous impor-
tance of public health surveillance in defining responses to
epidemics.
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